I read this book and I review it here not because of any particular interest in sanctioned killing, rather
because of my interest in institutional means of getting people to do difficult yet important tasks. I train
salespeople and other business leaders.
I first heard the author, Dave Grossman, on a radio interview promoting this book. I heard him say that
that in the history of combat from Alexander the Great through World War II only about 15% of soldiers
in battle were trying to kill the enemy. He's not talking about the long administrative and logistical tail
of the army. Only 15-20% of the people with guns or swords in their hands, facing an enemy trying to
harm them, were willing to kill that enemy. I know this is hard to believe. I first heard this statistic from
a pacifist and I called him a liar. Then I heard it from this author, a former US Army Colonel and military
historian, who references the research of the US Army's official W.W.II historian as well as many
other scholars.
Once one accepts this fact, two questions immediately present themselves: "Why?" and "What to do
about it?" The first question is easy: most humans have a deep and strong taboo against looking a
person in the face and destroying them. Many would literally rather die than cross that line. The second
question is more complex and hugely interesting.
Clearly, if only 15% of the assets you have expensively brought to face an enemy are performing, your
army has a major problem. The US Army raised this traditional firing rate from 15% up to 50% between
W.W.II and the Korean conflict and again to better than 95% in Vietnam and Desert Storm. The British
similarly increased their firing rate, to devastating effect in the Falklands against Argentines still
performing at traditional levels. All modern militaries have since solved the problem. How?
The low firing rates have been cured by the new ways modern militaries train and lead soldiers. This is
where my interest as a trainer of business leaders and salespeople is piqued. I have long noted that the
biggest problem with most sales people is that they will not do the uncomfortable or unfamiliar things
necessary to make more sales faster. It is not a knowledge problem, it is a performance problem. I
figured that if the Army could get most ordinary men to pull the trigger, similar methods ought to get
most typical salespeople to dial the telephone.
Grossman reports five factors which influence (determine?) the likelihood of a person to kill:
Predisposition of Killer, Attractiveness of Target, Distance from Target, Group Absolution, and
Demands of Authority.
Many of these factors were well understood and widely practiced in the days of 15% firing ratios. This
may be how armies got beyond relying on the 2% of the population willing to kill in combat without
dramatic prompting or remorse. A huge gap in combat performance remained because, "When people
become angry, or frightened, they stop thinking with their forebrain (the mind of a human being) and
start thinking with their midbrain (which is indistinguishable from the mind of an animal). They are
literally "scared out of their wits." The only thing that has any hope of influencing the midbrain is also
the only thing that influences a dog: classical and operant conditioning." [p. xviii] The big change came
when the US Army began, perhaps unintentionally, to incorporate the behaviors demonstrated by Pavlov
and B. F. Skinner and made training much more realistic, repetitive, and rewarding.
"World War II-era training was conducted on a grassy firing range..., on which the soldier shot at a
bull's-eye target. After he fired a series of shots the target was checked, and he was then given
feedback that told him where he hit.
"Modern training ... comes as close to simulating actual combat conditions as possible. The soldier
stands in a foxhole with full combat equipment, and man-shaped targets pop up briefly in front of him.
These are the eliciting stimuli that prompt the target behavior of shooting. If the target is hit, it
immediately drops, thus providing immediate feedback. Positive reinforcement is given when these hits
are exchanged for marksmanship badges... Traditional marksmanship training has been transformed into
a combat simulator." [p. 177]
And the citizen soldier has been transformed into a reliable killing machine: "When I went to boot camp
and did individual combat training they said if you walk into an ambush what you want to do is just do a
right face - you just turn right or left, whichever way the fire is corning from, and assault. I said, 'Man,
that's crazy. I'd never do anything like that. It's stupid.' The first time we came under fire, ... in Laos,
we did it automatically. Just like you look at your watch to see what time it is. We done a right face,
assaulted the hill -- a fortified position with concrete bunkers emplaced, machine guns, automatic
weapons -- and we took it. And we killed - I'd estimate probably thirty-five North Vietnamese
soldiers in the assault, and we only lost three killed." [p. 317]
Contrast that with the report of a commander in W.W. II: "Squad leaders and platoon sergeants had to
move up and down the firing line kicking men to get them to fire. We felt like we were doing good to get
two or three men out of a squad to fire." [p. xiv] Sounds a lot like what I hear from sales managers.
Perhaps because salespeople, like soldiers, find they must transgress strong taboos to be successful,
for example, intruding on strangers, talking about money, and persisting past, "No," to name only three.
The salesperson's taboos are clearly of a lesser import than the soldier's, yet the parallel is strong.
Both the soldier and the salesperson suffer when they fail to transcend taboos, even though ignoring
them is crucial to success and permission has been granted.
Redesigning a salesperson's training to take advantage of these well demonstrated methods of behavior
modification can have a similarly spectacular effect. Another key to enhanced salesperson performance
evident from Grossman's work is the value of on-the-job group dynamics. "Numerous studies have
concluded that men in combat are usually motivated to fight not by ideology or hate or fear, but by group
pressures and processes involving (1) regard for their comrades, (2) respect for their leaders, (3)
concern for their own reputation with both, and (4) an urge to contribute to the success of the group."
[p. 89] Many sales organizations, by contrast, pit salespeople against each other and minimize the role
of sales managers. It is a world of lone wolves, though teamwork and leadership are demonstrated
multipliers of effectiveness. How much of a multiplier? Modern armies have faced similarly equipped,
by traditionally trained enemies and killed 35 to 50 of their adversaries for each soldier lost. [p. 197]
Salespeople trained, organized, and lead on this model can also expect order-of-magnitude
improvements.
